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The Consequences from Issuing Invalid Municipal 
Debt: Examining the Voidable Debt Issues in the 
Detroit Bankruptcy and Puerto Rican Debt Crisis 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Puerto Rico is in serious trouble.1  The island commonwealth of 
3.5 million people has accumulated a deficit of over $70 billion 
(“Puerto Rican Debt Crisis”).2 Economists are split on whether this 
crisis will have any major impact on the United States economy, but so 
far its effects have been mostly limited to the bond market.3 Regardless 
of what happens in The Puerto Rican Debt Crisis, how the voidable debt 
obligation issue is resolved will almost certainly have a substantial 
impact on the United States economy. In all likelihood, Puerto Rico 
illegally issued municipal bonds in 2014 and 2015, and now seeks to 
declare $4.1 billion of its debts void.4 By doing this, Puerto Rico is 
following the example set by Detroit when, in 2013, the city attempted 
to void part of its debts by claiming it was illegally issued.5 Though  
such an outcome seems unlikely at first, the little applicable precedent 
that exists indicates that Puerto Rico will indeed be successful in 
declaring these bond obligations invalid and ultimately void.6 
Because bonds are typically viewed as a relatively safe 
investment  opportunity,  they  have  long  served  as  a  vital  source  of 
 
 
1. Nick Timiraos, Puerto Rico’s Drastic Population Loss Deepens Its Economic 
Crisis, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2016 7:35 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/puerto-ricos-drastic- 
population-http://www.wsjloss-deepens-its-economic-crisis-1467219467. 
2. Id. 
3. Mary Williams Walsh and Liz Moyer, How Puerto Rico Debt is Grappling With a 
Debt Crisis, N.Y TIMES (July 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/ 
dealbook/puerto-rico-debt-crisis-explained.html. 
4. Voidable debt refers to the fact that the debt obligations were unauthorized and 
invalid, and thus voidable. This should not be confused with voidable transfers. Francine 
McKenna, Puerto Rico Could Seek to Invalidate Over 4 billion in Debt, MARKETWATCH, 
(June 2, 2016, 11:37 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/puerto-rico-could-seek-to- 
invalidate-over-4-billion-of-debt-2016-06-02. 
5. See infra Part III. 
6. See infra Part IV. 
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support for both states and municipalities.7 Although some degree of  
risk is inherent in any investment, the complete voidance of a typically 
safe investment of this magnitude is outside of the average investor’s— 
and likely his broker’s—risk-benefit analysis.8 If Puerto Rico  is  
allowed to declare its obligations void, not only will it cost bondholders 
billions of dollars, it could also establish a dangerous precedent that 
could impact how future insolvent municipalities resolve their debt 
obligations.9 Although the issues in these  transactions  are  wide- 
ranging, there are two particular lessons that can be drawn from the 
Detroit and Puerto Rico cases: (1) current laws and regulations fail to 
protect investors from illegally issued bonds in municipal  debt 
securities, and (2) the role of counsel in ensuring the validity of such 
investments is currently insufficient. 
This Note analyzes the consequences of issuing invalid debt by 
examining the voidable debt situations in both the Detroit bankruptcy 
and The Puerto Rican Debt Crisis. Further, it highlights important 
lessons that can be drawn from these cases and advocates for certain 
changes that could help prevent similar incidents of this type in the 
future. This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II provides a brief 
background on municipal bond investing and the laws and regulations 
that govern such investments.10 Part III  discusses  the  voidable  debt 
issue that arose in the Detroit bankruptcy.11 Part IV  examines  the 
current voidable debt situation in Puerto Rico.12 Part V discusses the  
two primary lessons that can be drawn from these two cases.13 Part VI 
concludes  by   offering  policy   recommendations  as  to  how  best   to 
 
 
 
7. Dan Weil, Municipal Bonds: Investing Pros and Cons, BANKRATE, http:// 
www.bankrate.com/finance/investing/municipal-bonds-investing-1.aspx (last updated Oct. 
16, 2014) (“S&P Municipal Bond Index had a default rate of just 0.11% in 2013.”). 
8. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 35 
(2012) [hereinafter REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET], https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/studies/2012/munireport073112.pdf. 
9. Since there currently exists no precedent for how illegal municipal debt of this 
magnitude should be resolved, any precedent set in this area would be highly persuasive, 
and would provide future insolvent municipalities a route to void any of their obligations 
that they find to be unenforceable. 
10. See infra Part II. 
11. See infra Part III. 
12. See infra Part IV. 
13. See infra Part V. 
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prevent such situations in the future.14 
 
II. MUNICIPAL BOND INVESTING AT A GLANCE 
 
A. The Basics of Municipal Securities 
 
The municipal securities market is “critical” to the health of our 
nation’s economy.15 States, municipalities, U.S. territories, and other 
local government entities issue municipal securities to finance public 
projects and meet government cash flow needs,16 raising billions of 
dollars every year.17 Municipal securities come in a variety of forms, 
with different maturities, interest rates, and sources of payment.18 They 
are typically issued through an underwriting process,19 in which an 
underwriter, such as a bank, purchases the securities directly from the 
issuer, and then brings these securities to the market by selling to 
investors.20  When a municipality or corporation issues a bond, it creates 
a group of creditors—the holders of these bonds—to whom it becomes 
indebted.21 This exchange creates a contractual loan relationship22 
whereby the municipality borrows the money, or principal, from the 
creditors, and in exchange, the municipality makes interest payments23 
until  the  bond  matures,  at  which  point  the  municipality  pays  the 
 
 
 
14. See infra Part VI. 
15. REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 8, at i. 
16. Id. 
17. Municipal securities can be issued directly by state or local governments, or 
through related authorities or agencies. 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(29) (2015). Municipal securities 
also include debt issued by Puerto Rico, or any other possession of the United States.”  15 
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(16) (defining the term “State”). 
18. Philip Grommet, A Call For Action: An Analysis of the Impending Regulatory 
Crisis in the Municipal Securities Market, 38 J. LEGIS. 237, 243 (2012); REPORT ON THE 
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 8, at i (explaining that municipal bonds are 
issued with different maturity dates, fixed or variable interest rates, and with different 
payment sources in either revenue bond, which are generated from a certain project, and 
general obligation bonds which come from tax revenues). 
19. REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 8, at 15. 
20. Id. at v. (“Individuals, or ‘retail’ investors, directly or indirectly hold more than 
75% of the outstanding principal amount of municipal securities.”). 
21. Tamar Frankel, Municipalities In Distress: A Preventative View, 33 REV. BANKING 
& FIN. L. 779, 796 (2014). 
22. Grommet, supra note 18, at 241. 
23. Frankel, supra note 21, at 796. 
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principal back.24 
B. Municipal Securities Laws and Regulations 
 
Regulators in the municipal securities market include the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the Municipal  
Securities Rulemaking Board25 (“MSRB”), the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), and various other bank-regulatory 
agencies.26 The SEC has long been involved in the issuance of  
municipal debt27 with the objective of protecting municipal investors  
and facilitating capital formation.28 The MSRB was created by the 1975 
securities law amendments. 29 It is tasked with promoting rules 
governing the sale of municipal securities in order to prevent, among 
other things, fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices.30 The 
municipal securities market, though large in size, has not been subject to 
the same level of regulation as other investment markets.31 This  is 
because municipal securities, with the exception of the antifraud 
provisions,32  were  largely  exempted  from both  the  Securities Act  of 
 
24. REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 8, at iii; Charlotte W. 
Rhodes, Living in a Material World: Defining “Materiality” in the Municipal Bond Market 
and Rule 15c2-12, 72 WASH. & L. REV. 1989, 1994 (2015). 
25. Overview of Municipal Disclosure, SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MARKETS ASS’N, http:// 
www.sifma.org/issues/capital-markets/municipal-securities/muni-disclosure/overview/ 
(“The Securities Act Amendments of 1975 created the Municipal Securities Rulemaking 
Board (MSRB), a self-regulatory organization (SRO) that writes rules governing broker 
dealers engaged in municipal securities transactions . . . to prevent fraudulent and 
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster 
cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, and 
processing information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in municipal securities, 
to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market in  
municipal securities, and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest.”). 
26. Grommet, supra note 18, at 246. 
27. Darien Shanske, The Feds Are Already Here: The Federal Role In Municipal Debt 
Finance, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 798, 800 (2014) (explaining the role of the SEC? in 
dealing with municipalities in distress). 
28. REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 8, at 15. 
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4b (2015); REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, supra 
note 8, at 15. 
30. REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 8, at 15. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. The antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws prohibit any person, 
including municipal issuers and dealers, from making any untrue statement of material fact, 
or omitting any material facts necessary to make statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, in connection with the offer, 
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193333 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.34 Later amendments 
created some heightened requirements for entities in the municipal 
securities business,35 but they still expressly limited the SEC’s authority 
over the municipal issuers themselves.36 One notable exception is Rule 
15c2-12,37 which, albeit in a “circuitous” manner,38 strengthened the 
requirements on securities dealers with respect to the disclosures they 
must obtain from the municipal issuer.39 In the resulting regulatory 
regime, municipal issuers are overseen indirectly through the entities 
that deal in municipal securities.40 
Finally, state and local laws also govern the contracts that create 
these bond obligations.41 While federal law focuses on the procedures  
of issuing these bonds and their tax status, state laws place restrictions 
on the amount of such bonds and the usage of their proceeds.42 
Consequently, when bonds are issued in violation of requirements or 
limitations set by these laws, they generally are void.43 
 
purchase, or sale of any security. 
33. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78aa (2015). 
34.    15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2015); Shanske, supra note 27, at 800. 
35. REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 8, at i. (“The 1975 
Amendments required firms transacting business in municipal securities to register with the 
Commission as broker-dealers, required banks dealing in municipal securities to register as 
municipal securities dealers, and gave the Commission broad rulemaking and enforcement 
authority over such broker-dealers and municipal securities dealers.”). 
36. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 94 P.L. 29, 89 Stat. 97 Sect. 15B(d)(1) (“Neither 
the Commission nor the Board is authorized under this title, by rule or regulation, to require 
any issuer of municipal securities, directly or indirectly through a purchaser or prospective 
purchaser of securities from the issuer, to file with the Commission or the Board prior to the 
sale of such securities by the issuer any application, report, or document in connection with 
the issuance, sale, or distribution of such securities.”). 
37.    17 C.F.R. §240.15c2-12(c) (2016). 
38. Grommet, supra note 18, at 250. 
39. See Exchange Act Release No. 34961, “Municipal Securities Disclosure” (Nov 10, 
1994), 59 FR 59590 (Nov. 17, 1994), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/adpt6.txt 
(“1994 Amendment Release”) (explaining that 15c2-12 imposes requirements on municipal 
bond dealers and underwriters (in most offerings) offerings to obtain, review, and distribute 
to investors copies of the issuer’s disclosure documents, and prohibits underwriters from 
“purchasing or selling municipal securities in connection with a primary offering unless the 
issuer had committed to providing continuing disclosure regarding the security and issuer, 
including its financial condition and operating data”). 
40. See Grommet, supra note 18, at 250 (explaining how the current SEC regulations 
combine to create a “backdoor” regulatory scheme). 
41. REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 8, at 35. 
42. Brian  Reilly,  Let’s  Talk:  Avoiding  Trouble  with  Municipal  Bonds,  LEAGUE OF 
MINNESOTA CITIES, (July-Aug 2015), http://www.lmc.org/page/1/LetsTalkJulyAug2015.jsp. 
43. REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 8, at 38. 
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C. Municipal Securities Risk and Voidance 
 
Municipal bonds are not only a vital source of capital for 
government entities, they are also a comparably safe44 and tax friendly 
investment.45 While safety is a hallmark of municipal bonds, they are 
not completely without risk.46 As fixed-rate instruments, they are  
subject to interest rate risks that could result in the bond decreasing in 
value.47 An additional, though less common risk, is default risk, where 
the issuer may be unable to make scheduled interest payments or repay 
the principal after the bond has reached maturity.48 
While these risks are inherent in municipal bond investing, 
interest rate risk can be somewhat anticipated and default risk can 
generally be safeguarded against by properly analyzing the issuer’s 
creditworthiness.49 A risk that most bondholders would not consider, 
however, is that their investments could be declared completely void, 
with no interest payments or return of their principal.50 While this 
possibility is not likely contemplated by municipal securities investors, 
recent events demonstrate that it should be.51  Investors faced the loss of 
$1.44 billion of municipal bond investments in Detroit’s bankruptcy,52 
and now have $4.1 billion in bonds at risk in Puerto Rico.53 
 
44. Id. at ii. 
45. Grommet, supra note 18, at 250. 
46. See infra notes 47–48. 
47. Investopedia Staff, The Basics of Municipal Bonds, INVESTOPEDIA, http:// 
www.investopedia.com/articles/bonds/05/022805.asp (last updated Jan. 12, 2017). 
48. Id.; Dan Weil, Municipal Bonds: Investing Pros and Cons, BANKRATE (October 16, 
2014), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/investing/municipal-bonds-investing-1.aspx 
(“S&P Municipal Bond Index had a default rate of just 0.11% in 2013.”); Tara Siegal 
Bernard, Municipal Bonds Still Considered Safe, Despite Some Ailing Governments, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/25/your-money/municipal-bonds- 
still-considered-safe-despite-some-ailing-governments.html?_r=0 (stating that the S&P 
Municipal Bond Index default rate rose to 0.17% in 2014). 
49. Tara Siegal Bernard, Municipal Bonds Still Considered Safe, Despite Some Ailing 
Governments, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/25/your- 
money/municipal-bonds-still-considered-safe-despite-some-ailing-governments.html?_r=0 
(stating that the S&P Municipal Bond Index default rate rose to 0.17% in 2014). 
50. Investopedia Staff, The Basics of Municipal Bonds, INVESTOPEDIA, http:// 
www.investopedia.com/articles/bonds/05/022805.asp (last updated Jan. 12, 2017). 
51. See infra Part IV. 
52. Moneylife Digital Team, When Detriot, the World’s Traditional Auto Capital, Files 
for Bankruptcy, MONEYLIFE (July 19, 2013, 4:10 PM), http://www.moneylife.in/article/ 
when-detroit-the-worlds-traditional-auto-capital-files-for-bankruptcy/33708.html. 
53. See infra Part IV. 
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III. DETROIT BANKRUPTCY 
 
A. Detroit’s Voidable Debt Issue 
 
If the voidable debt issue in Puerto Rico was a singular 
occurrence, it could be written off as an honest mistake made by an 
ailing commonwealth. However, this exact issue occurred previously in 
Detroit. On July 13, 2013, the city of Detroit, finding itself at least $18 
billion in debt, filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy.54  The debt came in   
many forms, such as swaps payments owed to banks, pension liabilities, 
and post-employment benefits for Detroit’s retired workers. 55 The debt 
obligation that became the most controversial was its $1.44 billion in 
pension-related Certificates of Participation (“COP”).56  These  COPs 
were bonds issued to subsidize pension funds that Detroit did not have 
the money to pay.57 In order to facilitate the transaction, Detroit, at its 
debt limit, structured the deal in an “iffy”58 way to avoid calling it a 
debt.59 It did this by creating future service contracts (“Service 
Contracts”) via a newly created Service Corporation.60 The Service 
Corporation then sold COPs and used the proceeds to satisfy pension 
fund obligations.61 Later, Detroit argued that these contracts were 
actually debt obligations in violation of Michigan law, and, 
consequently, unenforceable and void.62 The creditors objected and 
litigation ensued.63 
 
 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Karen Pierog, Participants In Detroit Pension Borrowing Knew Debt Sale Was 
‘iffy’: City Lawyer, BUSINESS    INSIDER, (Oct. 1, 2014 2:36PM), http:// 
www.businessinsider.com/r-participants-in-detroit-pension-borrowing-knew-debt-sale-was- 
iffy-city-lawyer-2014-10 (The COP transaction was described by Detroit’s attorney as “iffy” 
and by FGIC’s attorney as “fraudulent.”). 
59. City of Detroit’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss in part FGIC’s 
Counterclaims at 10, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. August 28, 
2014). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 15. 
63. Karen Pierog, Detroit Files Lawsuit Seeking to Void Pension Debt, REUTERS, (Jan. 
31, 2014 9:47PM) http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-detroit-bankruptcy-pensions- 
idUSBREA0U11B20140201. 
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Detroit argued that the $1.44 billion in bonds64 were not issued 
in compliance with Michigan’s Home Rule City Act.65 Additionally, 
Detroit argued that it could only incur debt if it was specifically 
authorized by the state,66 and that it failed to meet the conditions of the 
Michigan Revised Municipal Finance Act67—the  granting  statute.68  
The argument then turned to whether or not recovery should be granted 
to the bondholders under these illegal contracts.  Detroit first pointed to  
a Michigan Supreme Court case American Trust Co. v. Michigan Trust 
Co.69 and other Michigan cases to show that Michigan courts had long 
refused to enforce or grant relief under illegal contracts.  70  It  then 
pointed to another Michigan Supreme Court case, McCurdy v. 
Shiawasee County.71 This case specifically dealt with illegally issued 
municipal debt and held that the county was not liable for the money it 
had received under the illegal contract.72  Finally, Detroit cited to the 
U.S. Supreme Court case City of Litchfield v. Ballou,73 which held that 
borrowing above a state debt ceiling allowed the issuer of such debt to 
 
64. Id. 
65. Under the Michigan Home Rule City Act (“HRCA”), MCLA § 117.4a, the 
maximum indebtedness a city could incur was the greater of (1) 10% of the assessed value  
of all real and personal property in the city; or (2) 15% of the assessed value of all the real 
and personal property in the city if that portion of the total amount of indebtedness incurred 
which exceeded 10% was or had been used solely for the construction or renovation of 
hospital facilities. 
66. City of Detroit’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss in part FGIC’s 
Counterclaims at 9, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. August 28,  
2014) (pointing to Mich. Const., art. VII, § 21 that says that the legislature shall provide by 
general laws for the incorporation of cities, and that such laws shall restrict the powers of 
cities to borrow money and contract debts). 
67. Michigan Revised Municipal Finance Act, MCL § 141.2101. 
68. City of Detroit’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss in part FGIC’s 
Counterclaims at 9, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. August 28,  
2014) (“It is also undisputed that the COPs were not issued in accordance with the 
requirements of [The Michigan Revised Municipal Finance Act], including, among other 
things, the requirement that the State Treasury Department qualify or approve any municipal 
borrowing.”). 
69. American Trust Co. v. Michigan Trust Co., 248 N.W. 829, 830 (Mich. 1933) (“The 
general rule of law is, that a contract made in violation of a statute is void; and that when a 
plaintiff cannot establish his cause of action without relying upon an illegal contract, he 
cannot recover.”) (quoting Miller v. Ammon, 145 U.S. 421, 426 (U.S. 1892)). 
70. Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Defendant Financial Guaranty Insurance 
Company at 17, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. August 28, 2014). 
71. McCurdy v. Shiawasee County, 118 N.W. 625, 629 (1908). 
72. Id. (holding that the county had no authority to incur the debt, and therefore the 
notes were void). 
73. City of Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U.S. 190, 191–192 (1885). 
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declare it invalid,74 as authority for its position that it had no obligation 
to continue making payments to the Service Corporations or to the 
Funding Trusts.75 
On the other side, the Financial Guaranty Insurance Company 
(“FGIC”), which Detroit solicited to insure its bonds,76 argued that the 
creditors were entitled to an alternate recovery such as unjust 
enrichment, based on the contractual defenses of mistake and 
misrepresentation.77 FGIC also argued that Detroit would receive a 
windfall if it were not required to restore each party to its pre-contract 
financial position.78 To strengthen this argument, FGIC attempted to 
distinguish the Detroit situation from Litchfield by  arguing that, unlike 
in Litchfield, Detroit was not completely without authority  to take part 
in a transaction of this type.79 Moreover, FGIC argued that the money 
raised by the COP transactions was “segregated and readily 
identifiable,” contrary to the funds in Litchfield, and that under such 
circumstances courts are likely to allow some equitable recovery under 
an invalid contract.80 Additionally, FGIC also argued that the Litchfield 
case dealt with the Illinois constitutional prohibition on raising money  
in any kind and for any purpose, while here there was only a 
constitutional mandate to address liability and the ability to raise  
funds.81   Thus  FGIC further argued  that  the  case  law  relied upon by 
 
74. Id. 
75. Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Defendant Financial Guaranty Insurance 
Company at 17, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. August 28, 2014). 
76. Financial Guaranty Insurance Company’s Motion To Intervene Pursuant To Rule 
7024 Of The Federal Rules Of Bankruptcy Procedure And Section 1109(B) Of The 
Bankruptcy Code at 36, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. August 28, 
2014). 
77. Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Defendant Financial Guaranty Insurance 
Company at 17, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. August 28, 2014). 
78. Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Certificate Holders at 23, In re City  of 
Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. August 28, 2014). 
79. Financial Guaranty Insurance Company’s Opposition to City of Detroit’s Motion to 
Dismiss in Part FGIC’s Counterclaims at 36, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mich. August 28, 2014). 
80. Id.; City of Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U.S. 190, 195 (1885) (“If the complainants are 
after the money they let the city have, they must clearly identify the money or the fund, or 
other property which represents that money, in such a manner that it can be reclaimed and 
delivered without taking other property with it, or injuring other persons or interfering with 
others’ rights.”). 
81. Financial Guaranty Insurance Company’s Opposition to City of Detroit’s Motion to 
Dismiss in Part FGIC’s Counterclaims at 36, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mich. August 28, 2014). 
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Detroit did not support a blanket prohibition on equitable remedies, and 
hence, that Litchfield did not preclude recovery.82 The FGIC closed by 
arguing that courts have imposed equitable remedies to avoid unjust 
outcomes,83 noting that the McCurdy court was not presented with the 
question of whether a municipality would have to return the conferred 
benefit under a void contract.84 
The parties settled without a ruling, so no precedent was created 
on this issue.85 However, the presiding judge in the case stated that 
Detroit’s argument had “substantial merit,” and that its claim would 
have had a “reasonable likelihood of  success.”86  The  Detroit 
bankruptcy demonstrates that the issue in Puerto Rico is not an  
anomaly, and voidable debt issues may continue to arise in future 
municipal insolvency cases. 
 
B. The Role of Bond Counsel in Detroit’s Offering 
 
In the 2005 Detroit COP offering, Detroit hired the local firm 
Lewis & Muday PC to act as certificate counsel and deliver an opinion 
regarding the validity of its bond contracts.87 On the other side, UBS, 
who served as the managing underwriter, hired Honigman Miller 
Schwartz and Cohn LLP as its counsel.88 Lewis & Munday issued legal 
opinions on June 2, 2005, and again June 12, 2006, for the second 
issuance.89 The opinions stated that the Service Contracts were indeed 
validly authorized and executed, and hence valid and binding 
agreements     between     Detroit     and     the     Service  Corporation.90 
 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 34. 
84. Id. at 35. 
85. Francine McKenna, Puerto Rico Could Seek to Invalidate Over 4 billion in Debt, 
MARKETWATCH, (June 2, 2016, 11:37 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/puerto- 
rico-could-seek-to-invalidate-over-4-billion-of-debt-2016-06-02. 
86. Id. 
87. DETROIT CERTIFICATES OF PARTICIPATION OFFERING 21 (2005), http:// 
emma.msrb.org/MS45312-MS210431-MS613402.pdf. The city employed  Lewis  & 
Munday as bond counsel, relying on their expertise and history in the state to help create  
and ensure the legal framework would work. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. City of Detroit’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss in part FGIC’s 
Counterclaims at 24, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. August 28, 
2014). 
90. Joint Motion Of Certificate Holders To Intervene at 36, In re City of Detroit, No. 
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Furthermore, it stated that the obligation of Detroit to pay the Service 
Corporation’s Funding Trust did not constitute “indebtedness” within 
the meaning of Michigan’s Home Rule City Act.91  Finally, it opined  
that the COPs were validly issued, Detroit had authority to make the 
offering,92 and that the transaction was valid.93 
After counsel validated the bond offering, Detroit and the 
underwriters had FGIC insure the bonds.94 They did this by providing 
FGIC with opinion letters prepared by their respective counsel, Lewis & 
Munday for Detroit and Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn for UBS, 
which stated that Detroit’s contractual obligations under the proposed 
contract were valid and “could not constitute indebtedness under 
Michigan law or be subject to any limitations on Detroit’s net 
indebtedness capacity.”95 FGIC,  relying  on  these  representations, 
agreed to insure the bonds.96 After prolonged negotiations, FGIC and 
Detroit reached a settlement that gave the FGIC a portion of its claim.97 
As of early 2017, FGIC has not pursued any legal action against the law 
firms involved. 
 
 
 
 
 
13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. August 28, 2014). 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 59. 
93. Id. at 41. 
94. Financial Guaranty Insurance Company’s Motion To Intervene Pursuant To Rule 
7024 Of The Federal Rules Of Bankruptcy Procedure And Section 1109(B) Of The 
Bankruptcy Code at 36, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. August 28, 
2014). 
95. City of Detroit’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss in part FGIC’s 
Counterclaims at 20, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. August 28, 
2014). 
96. Joint Motion Of Certificate Holders To Intervene at 36, In re City of Detroit, No. 
13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. August 28, 2014) (“In connection with the Pension Funding 
Transaction, in both 2005 and 2006, the City made numerous warranties, representations, 
and covenants regarding the lawfulness and enforceability of the Pension Funding 
Transaction, including that such transaction was a valid exercise of the City’s municipal 
authority, was not subject to any debt limitations, and required no further action by any 
governmental body, agency or official. Without these and other material warranties, 
representations, and covenants as inducements, Interveners would not have participated in 
the transactions.”). 
97. Caitlin Devitt, Leaving Bankruptcy, Detroit Takes on $1.28B of New Debt, THE 
BOND BUYER, (Dec. 11 2014), http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/regionalnews/leaving- 
bankruptcy-detroit-takes-on-1b-of-new-debt-1068692-1.html. 
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IV. PUERTO RICO’S DEBT CRISIS 
 
A. Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis and Its Voidable Bonds 
 
Puerto Rico continues to find itself in a dire financial crisis as 
2017 begins.98  The island has continually borrowed money over the   
past thirty years by issuing municipal bonds in order to pay off past 
debts and compensate for its declining government revenue,99 ultimately 
resulting in $72.2 billion in debt.100 As it stands, Puerto Rico is unable  
to make its upcoming debt payments,101 and is unable to file for Chapter 
9 bankruptcy to restructure its debts as Detroit did.102 This is because in 
1984, Congress adopted Section 903(1) of the Bankruptcy code, which 
amended the definition of “State” in a way that restricts Puerto Rico and 
its instrumentalities from accessing Chapter  9.103  Thirty-three  years 
later, in response, President Obama signed the Puerto Rico Oversight, 
Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”), which issued 
an automatic stay on all pending litigation against Puerto Rico until 
February of 2017. 104 This was intended to allow Puerto Rico and its 
bondholders’ time to reach a settlement agreement.105 If no agreement 
can be made, PROMESA allows for a judicial reorganization—modeled 
after Chapter 9 bankruptcy—of Puerto Rico’s debt.106 
In June 2016, an audit report released by the Commission for  
the Comprehensive Audit of Puerto Rico’s Public Credit complicated 
any potential settlement agreement by suggesting that Puerto Rico  
might be able to declare some of its debt void.107  The report found that 
 
98. David R. Martin, Back Story on Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis, THE HILL (Sept. 9, 2015 
1:00PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/252723-back-story-on- 
puerto-ricos-debt-crisis. 
99. Mary Williams Walsh and Liz Moyer, How Puerto Rico Debt is Grappling With a 
Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/ 
dealbook/puerto-rico-debt-crisis-explained.html. 
100. Martin, supra note 98. 
101. Milton Vescovacci, The Demise of Puerto Is In Part Attributed to U.S. 
Congressional Action, 28 BANKR. L. REP. (BNA), No. 25 at 825 (June 23, 2016). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Stephen Selbst, Puerto Rico Financial Oversight Law Enacted, 28 BANKR. L. REP. 
(BNA) No. 31 at 1031 (Aug. 10, 2016). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. PUERTO RICO COMM’N FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE AUDIT OF THE PUB. CREDIT,  PRE- 
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portions of the debt were issued in violation of the balanced-budget 
clause in Puerto Rico’s Constitution.108 This clause prohibits borrowing 
to finance operating deficits, and states that Puerto Rico cannot take out 
any debt that would make it spend more than 15% of internal revenues 
on general obligation debt.109 The audit report confirmed that Puerto 
Rico was in all likelihood borrowing to finance operating deficits, and 
suggested that Puerto Rico has been spending anywhere from fourteen 
to 25% of its internal revenue on general obligation debt.110 
Consequently, these contracts were likely illegal, which would make 
them unenforceable and possibly void.111 Specifically, the 2014 $3.5 
billion General Obligation Bond offering and the 2015 $900 million 
offering of Tax Refund Anticipation notes were each likely illegally 
issued.112 If this turns out to be the case, creditors who invested in these 
bonds stand to lose at least $4.1 billion.113 
In light of the magnitude of Puerto Rico’s financial situation, the 
possibility of simply voiding part of its debts is an attractive option, and 
it appears it has the authority to do so.114 However, this seems to be a 
highly inequitable result. How can Puerto Rico’s penalty for illegally 
borrowing above its means be that it is allowed to declare the debts void 
and keep the money for itself?   Despite the manifest unfairness of such 
a result, the applicable law indicates that this is likely the proper legal 
result.115 
 
B. Why Puerto Rico’s Bonds are Unenforceable and Voidable, and 
Possible Recourse 
 
If the bond contracts are deemed illegal, then Puerto Rico will 
argue  that  under  Puerto  Rico’s  Constitution,  the  bond  contracts are 
 
 
AUDIT SURVEY REPORT 2 (2016). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 27. The term void as used here means that any obligation that did exist under 
this contract no longer exists, and the contract ceases to exist with no further action taken on 
it, each party remaining in its present state. Id. 
112. McKenna, supra note 85. 
113. See infra Part IV. 
114. McKenna, supra note 85. 
115. See infra Part IV B. 
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unenforceable by the bondholders, and thus can be declared void.116 
Puerto Rico’s bondholders on the other hand will likely argue that, 
although the contracts may be invalid, they are still entitled to receive 
some quasi-contractual equitable relief, such as restitution.117 However, 
as evidenced by the city of Detroit’s arguments, courts do not generally 
grant restitution under agreements that are unenforceable on public 
policy grounds.118 Specifically here, in order to determine if the 
bondholders can receive some quasi-contractual recovery, the court will 
apply state law.119 As is standard with bond offerings, both the 2014 
General Obligation Bond offering and 2015 Tax Refund Anticipation 
Notes in Puerto Rico contained a choice of law provision.120 These 
provisions stated that New York law would apply in all instances except 
with respect to “authorization,” where the laws of Puerto Rico would 
apply.121 Whether a court will enforce a choice-of-law clause is not 
always apparent at the outset, and there is room to dispute which law 
will apply here.122  However, regardless of which state’s law applies, it  
is likely that Puerto Rico will be able to declare its obligations void and 
its creditors will be entitled to nothing. This is because, like Michigan 
state law, Puerto Rican case law indicates that if Puerto Rico has 
borrowed contrary to statutory requirements, then it is allowed to  
declare its debt obligation void.123   The same is true with New York 
 
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (“A voidable 
contract is one where a party has the power to elect to avoid its legal obligation created by 
the contract.”). 
117. See supra Part III. 
118. E. Allen Farnsworth, Contracts § 5.9 (2004). 
119. REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 8, at i. 
120. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS OF 2014 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 30 (2014), available at http://www.gdbpr.com/investors_resources/ 
documents/CommonwealthPRGO2014SeriesA-FinalOS.PDF (“The Bonds and the Bond 
Resolution are governed by and are to be construed in accordance with the laws of the State 
of New York, except with respect to authorization (or in the case of the Bond Resolution, 
adoption) and execution of the same by the Commonwealth, which shall be governed by the 
laws of the Commonwealth.”). See PUERTO RICO COMM’N FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE AUDIT 
OF THE PUBLIC CREDIT, supra note 107, at 15 (stating that the 2015 agreement required that 
New York law govern the agreement like the 2014 general obligation bond offering). 
121. Id. This provision is a bit ambiguous, and there is room for dispute as to which law 
should apply, as the issue could be characterized as an authorization issue—Puerto Rico 
claiming it didn’t have the authority to make the offering—or as a suit for recovery under 
the bonds, which would fall under the “in all instances except” provision. 
122. For more on choice of law, see John F. Coyle, The Canons of Construction for 
Choice-of-Law Clauses, 92 Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017). 
123. Las Marias v. Municipio San Juan, 156 D.P.R. 868, 872 (P.R. 2003), 2003 WL 
  
 
2017] VOIDABLE MUNICIPAL DEBT 209 
case law, as New York has yet to allow recovery against a municipality 
under a contract it has deemed illegal.124 The highest courts in Puerto 
Rico, New York, and Michigan have consistently held that the policy 
against awarding damages under an illegal contract—maintaining the 
integrity of the law and preventing future parties from engaging in such 
deals—outweighs the potential loss to the other parties.125 
Furthermore, Supreme Court precedent set forth in City of 
Litchfield v. Ballou126 points to no recovery against municipalities under 
illegal contracts.127 The Ballou Court decided that borrowing above a 
state debt ceiling allowed the issuer of such debt to declare it invalid.128 
In Ballou, the city of Litchfield, Illinois, defended non-payment of its 
bonds on the grounds that the bonds were issued in violation of the state 
constitution and were therefore voidable.129 The state constitution 
contained an article that declared that “no county, city, township, school 
 
 
21706387; Hatton v. Municipio de Ponce, 134 D.P.R. 1001, 1005 (P.R. 1993), 1994 WL 
909605; Morales v. Municipio de Toa Baja, 119 D.P.R. 682, 689 (P.R. 1941), 1987 WL 
448260; González v. Municipality, 61 P.R.R. 357 (1943) (refusing to grant recovery in a 
case of a contract executed without the pertinent appropriation in the municipal budget for 
covering the corresponding expense). 
124. See, e.g., Granada Buildings, Inc. v. City of Kingston, 444 N.E.2d 1325, 1326  
(N.Y. 1982) (disallowing recovery against a municipality for policy reasons); S. T. Grand, 
Inc. v. City of New York, 38 A.D.2d 467, 474 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1972) (dismissing 
contractor’s action for recovery of an unpaid contract balance because the contract was 
acquired illegally via a kickback, and as such was unenforceable); Albany Supply & Equip. 
Co. v. Cohoes, 25 A.D.2d 700, 701 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1966) (affirming that since the 
verbal contracts were made in direct contravention of the applicable law, there was a lack of 
authority on the part of agents of a municipal corporation to create a liability, no liability for 
the municipality could result); Lutzken v. City of Rochester, 7 A.D.2d 498, 451 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 4th Dep’t 1959) (concluding that no legal obligation existed to compensate the 
individual who removed government tree stumps, because the equitable powers of the courts 
could not be invoked to sanction a disregard of the statutory requirements necessary to 
contract with a city for services when public money was at issue); Seif v. Long Beach, 36 
N.E.2d 630, 631 (N.Y. 1941) (finding that because the city charter only allowed the council 
to appoint officers or employees when acting as a body at a properly held meeting, the 
attorney’s assignee should not have been permitted to recover under a theory of tacit 
ratification since his appointment was not legal). 
125. See Hatton, 134 D.P.R. at 1005, 1994 WL 909605 (“Regardless of the sum 
involved—or whether it is a routine or exceptional procedure—the use of public funds is 
undoubtedly invested with great public interest.”). 
126. City of Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U.S. 190, 191 (1885). 
127. See id. at 190–92 (holding that because the bonds violated Ill. Const. art. IX, § 12, 
which limited the amount of indebtedness that the city was permitted to incur, the bonds 
were void and unenforceable). 
128.    Id. at 191–92. 
129. Id. 
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district, or other municipal corporation, shall be allowed to become 
indebted in any manner, or for any purpose, to an amount, including 
existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding five per centum on the 
value of the taxable property therein.”130 The Supreme Court followed  
its prior holding in Buchanon v. City of Litchfield,131 which ruled that 
despite the moral considerations and hardship the bondholders would 
face, the settled principles of law could not “be disregarded in order to 
remedy the hardships of special cases,” and granted no recovery for 
Ballou.132 The Court justified its decision by explaining that  the  
plaintiff could not circumvent the problem of suing on an illegal 
contract by bringing a claim in equity.133 While Puerto Rico’s 
bondholders may try to distinguish between Litchfield and the present 
case as the Detroit creditors did,134 Puerto Rico will likely point to this 
case as settling the issue in its favor.135 
While it is likely that Puerto Rico’s bondholders will be denied 
quasi-contractual recovery, there are some caveats to such an 
outcome.136 First, while the precedent from both New York and Puerto 
Rico indicates that there should be no recovery under an illegal contract 
with a municipality, New York law is slightly more favorable for 
bondholders.137 Although both Puerto Rico and New York case law 
indicate  that  equitable  remedies  such  as  unjust  enrichment  are  not 
 
 
 
130. Id. at 192 (quoting Buchanon v. City of Litchfield, 102 U.S. 278, 280 (1880). 
131. Buchanon v. City of Litchfield, 102 U.S. 278, 280 (1880). 
132.    Ballou, 114 U.S. at 191–92. 
133. See id. at 192–93 (holding that because the bonds violated Ill. Const. art. IX, § 12, 
which limited the amount of indebtedness that the city was permitted to incur, the bonds 
were void and unenforceable). 
134. Fin. Guaranty Ins. Co. Opposition to City of Detroit’s Mot. to Dismiss in Part 
FGIC’s Counterclaims at 36, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. August 
28, 2014). 
135. See supra Part III. 
136. Such caveats include the relief the presiding court determines is appropriate. While 
unjust enrichment is the remedy that makes the most sense, there is a long line of cases that 
have awarded quantum meruit damages as a quasi-contractual remedy against  a 
municipality in New York, though this would be a tough argument to make since this 
remedy is typically given for work done, not money given over. See Aniero Concrete Co. v. 
New York City Constr. Auth., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8833 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2000) 
(holding that public policy prevented Aniero from recovering in quasi-contract for work that 
was not furnished pursuant to a contract complying with the statutory “competitive bidding 
process”). 
137. See infra note 138. 
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prohibited per se against a municipality,138 it appears that New York has 
only applied this in a case where a contract was unenforceable by law or 
local provision.139 Thus, if New York law is applied, bondholders may 
have a better shot at recovery.140  Second, there is very little precedent   
in this area, and none dealing with a bond issuance of this magnitude.141 
Most cases that deal with unjust enrichment against a municipality deal 
with issues such as contracts being declared void for failing to meet 
bidding requirements.142 However, in most of these cases, courts have 
decided not to hold a municipality liable on a quasi-contractual theory, 
as doing so would likely spur lawsuits from disgruntled, or perhaps 
opportunistic, contractors.143  Finally, because there is so little precedent 
 
138. See, e.g., Aniero Concrete Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8833 (holding that public 
policy prevented Aniero from recovering in quasi-contract for work that was not furnished 
pursuant to a contract complying with the statutory “competitive bidding process”); Parsa v. 
State of New York, 474 N.E.2d 235, 238 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that a physician could 
maintain, but failed to prove, an action in quasi contract against the State to recover money 
paid by the federal government for services allegedly performed by the physician pursuant  
to a State contract that was not properly approved, since the claimant was not seeking to 
enforce an agreement, but rather to recover funds from the State which he alleged belonged 
to him and which the State was wrongfully withholding from him); Gerzof v. Sweeny, 239 
N.E.2d 521, 644–45 (N.Y.1968) (finding that although the illegality of the contract here 
would normally require the vendor to return all monies paid by the village, the vendor  
would be allowed to retain much of its interest in the generator in light of the magnitude of 
both the forfeiture and the enrichment afforded the village); Vrooman v. Village of 
Middleville, 91 A.D.2d 833, 834 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1982) (holding that even though 
the contract between the village and Vrooman was unenforceable, quantum meruit recovery 
was allowable because the project “had been ordered by the state, the services provided by 
plaintiff were essential to the project, and the village significantly benefitted from them”). 
Plan Bienestar Salud v. Alcalde Cabo Rojo, 114 D.P.R. 697, 698 (P.R.1983), 1983 WL 
204161 at *3 (“In the case of Puerto Rico, the situations examined so far by the Court have 
not led to the application of the unjust enrichment doctrine.”). 
139. Gerzof v. Sweeny, 239 N.E.2d 521, 644–45 (N.Y.1968); Vrooman v. Village of 
Middleville, 91 A.D.2d at 834. 
140. See supra IV.B. 
141. Based on Author’s research. 
142. See, e.g., Aniero Concrete Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8833 at *3 (holding that 
public policy prevented Aniero from recovering in quasi-contract for work that was not 
furnished pursuant to a contract complying with the statutory “competitive bidding 
process”). 
143. Jerald J. Director, Liability of Municipality on Quasi Contract for Value of  
Property or Work Furnished Without Compliance with Bidding Requirements, AMERICAN 
LAW REPORTS, 33 A.L.R.3d 1164, 1164 (1970); see, e.g., Granada Buildings, Inc. v. City of 
Kingston, 444 N.E.2d 1324, 1326 (N.Y. 1982) (disallowing recovery against a municipality 
for policy reasons); Gerzof, 239 N.E.2d at 644–45 (finding that although the illegality of the 
contract here would normally require the vendor to return all monies paid by the village, the 
vendor would be allowed to retain much of its interest in the generator in light of the 
magnitude of both the forfeiture and the enrichment afforded the village). 
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in this area, the presiding judge will have a great deal of discretion, 
which could easily change the outcome. Still, case law from Puerto  
Rico and New York indicates that the scales are tipped significantly in 
Puerto Rico’s favor, and even if the presiding judge makes 
classifications beneficial to the bondholders, the precedent is 
overwhelmingly in favor of no recovery being  granted.144  
Consequently, this issue could hurt the current negotiations between 
Puerto Rico and its creditors. Puerto Rico, believing the contracts are 
void, will refuse to pay anything on the bonds, while the bondholders 
will wait until PROMESA’s automatic stay passes and argue they  
should still be granted some sort of recovery on equitable grounds. 
 
C. The Role of Bond Counsel in the Puerto Rican Offerings 
 
The Puerto Rican bond offering disclosures each contained a 
disclaimer stating that Puerto Rico’s authority to issue the bonds was 
subject to the aforementioned Constitutional provisions.145 However,  
any concern as to the authority of Puerto Rico to make this offering 
should have been extinguished when bond counsel from each side 
signed off on the validity of the agreement.146 In both of Puerto Rico’s 
illegal issuances, major, well-respected law firms served as counsel and 
delivered the opinion to Puerto Rico that its bond obligations would be 
valid.147 The typical opinion states that counsel has examined  a  
certified copy of the transcript of proceedings authorizing the bonds,  
and that based on this examination, the lawyer is of the opinion that the 
securities are legal and binding obligations of the issuer.148  For the  
2014 offering, Puerto Rico engaged several law firms to advise on the 
matter and retained Greenberg Traurig LLP (“Greenberg”) to serve as 
counsel  for  Puerto  Rico.149    For  the  2015  Tax  Refund Anticipation 
 
 
144. See supra Part IV.B. 
145. See PUERTO RICO COMM’N FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE AUDIT OF THE PUB. CREDIT, 
supra note 107, at 23 (discussing the Puerto Rican Constitution as it relates to municipal 
bonds for debt financing). 
146. See infra Part V.B. 
147. PUERTO RICO COMM’N FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE AUDIT OF THE PUB. CREDIT, supra 
note 107, at 9. 
148. C. Richard Johnson & Robert H. Wheeler, Securities Law Duties of Bond Counsel, 
1976 DUKE L.J. 1205, 1208 (1975). 
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Notes, the law firm of Pietrantoni, Mendez, and Alvarez LLC advised 
Puerto Rico, and Squire, Patton, and Boggs served as bond counsel to a 
syndicate of banks led by J.P. Morgan.150 All of the firms declared that 
the deal was validly entered into151 and each firm received $235,000 in 
legal fees.152 
Greenberg, as bond counsel for Puerto Rico, examined many 
laws153 in order to ascertain whether or not Puerto Rico had the  
authority to make the offering, and found that “[t]he Bonds  [were] 
issued pursuant to the Acts and the Bond Resolution.”154 With respect  
to the underlying facts for the opinion, Greenberg “relied on 
representations of the Secretary contained in the Bond Resolution” 
along with other certifications provided to them without verifying the 
information by way of an independent investigation.155 It gave the 
opinion that (1) the acts were valid; (2) the proceedings were validly 
and legally taken; and (3) these acts, proceedings, and certification 
showed lawful authority for the issuance and sale of the bonds.156 It  
went further to say that “the [b]onds constitute valid and binding  
general obligations of the Commonwealth for the payment of the 
principal of and the interest on the [b]onds.”157 Peculiarly, nowhere in 
their opinion letter did Greenberg address the Constitutional provision 
 
 
 
149. PUERTO RICO COMM’N FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE AUDIT OF THE PUB. CREDIT, supra 
note 107, at 9. 
150. PUERTO RICO COMM’N FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE AUDIT OF THE PUB. CREDIT, supra 
note 107, at 9. 
151. PUERTO RICO COMM’N FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE AUDIT OF THE PUB. CREDIT, supra 
note 107, at 9. 
152. PUERTO RICO COMM’N FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE AUDIT OF THE PUB. CREDIT, supra 
note 107, at 9. 
153. See COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, supra note 120, at app. III-1 (describing the 
specific laws that counsel examined in making their determination, including Act No. 33, 
Act No. 242-2011, Act No. 45-2013, and Act No. 34-14). 
154. See COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, supra note 120, at app. III-1 (describing the 
specific laws that counsel examined in making their determination, including Act No. 33, 
Act No. 242-2011, Act No. 45-2013, and Act No. 34-14). 
155. See COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, supra note 120, at app. III-1 (describing the 
specific laws that counsel examined in making their determination, including Act No. 33, 
Act No. 242-2011, Act No. 45-2013, and Act No. 34-14). 
156. See COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, supra note 120, at app. III-1 (describing the 
specific laws that counsel examined in making their determination, including Act No. 33, 
Act No. 242-2011, Act No. 45-2013, and Act No. 34-14). 
157. Id. 
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discussed in the bond disclosure statement itself,158 which has  now 
likely made these obligations illegal and void.159 
 
D. Possible Recourse for Puerto Rico’s Bondholders 
 
Because creditors will in all likelihood be unable to recover 
against Puerto Rico, they may try to seek alternative recourse against  
the bond counsel who signed off on the validity of Puerto Rico’s bond 
offering.160 Though bond opinions are not meant to be a guarantee, 
counsel can nevertheless be held liable for an erroneous opinion.161 In  
In re Flight Transportation Corporation Securities Litigation,162 
purchasers of securities brought an action alleging negligent 
misrepresentation against the law firm that represented the underwriter 
in a public offering of securities.163 The purchasers argued that the law 
firm assisted in the preparation of the disclosure information and failed 
to exercise its duty of conducting a “due diligence” investigation of the 
information contained in the disclosure.164 While the plaintiffs here 
alleged fraud and foul play by the defense counsel,165 this case shows 
that a firm could be held liable for its mistakes, as the negligence action 
against the underwriter’s counsel survived the defendant’s motion to 
 
158. Id. 
159. See supra Part IV.B. 
160. Existing case law indicates this may be possible. See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. 
Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988) (where a group of bondholders sought to hold the 
underwriter’s counsel liable for malpractice); Bradford Sec. Processing Serv. v. Plaza Bank 
& Tr., 653 P.2d 188 (Okla. 1982) (holding bond counsel liable for giving a negligent  
opinion about certain elements of the bond issue); Security Bank & Tr. v. Fabricating, Inc., 
673 S.W.2d 860 (Tenn. 1983) (holding the municipality’s bond counsel liable for its 
negligence in failing to investigate and discover errors in the issuer’s financial statements); 
Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz & Wilson v. Cent. Bank Denver, 892 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1995) 
(finding that an attorney who issued a legal opinion in connection with a municipal note or 
bond offering owed a duty to a non-client that would support a claim for negligent 
misrepresentation when the legal opinion was issued at the request of his client for the 
purpose of inducing the non-client to purchase municipal bonds issued by the client). 
161. NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, THE FUNCTION AND  PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY OF BOND COUNSEL 20 (2011), https://www.nabl.org/portals/0/documents/ 
nabl_function_and_professional_responsibilities_of_bond_counsel.pdf. 
162. In re Flight Transportation Corporation Securities Litigation, 593 F. Supp. 612 (D. 
Minn. 1984). 
163.    Id. at 612. 
164.    Id. at 614. 
165. Id. at 615. No fraud or foul play has been alleged against Puerto Rico’s counsel at 
this time. 
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dismiss.166 While a bond opinion is not meant to be a guarantee of all of 
the matters it addresses, an “erroneous” opinion—such as the one given 
by Puerto Rico’s bond counsel—can nevertheless result in liability for 
bond counsel under certain state law.167 Whether or not the creditors 
would be successful in a suit is uncertain, but such an action could offer 
an alternative path to recourse down the line.168 
 
E. Where Puerto Rico Stands 
 
On October 14, 2016, Governor Alejandro Padilla submitted a 
fiscal plan for Puerto Rico, which is currently in the process of being 
approved, and will determine the extent of the restructuring Puerto Rico 
needs to undergo.169 At the same time, negotiations between Puerto  
Rico and its creditors have been unsuccessful, as some of Puerto Rico’s 
creditors are still fighting to have the automatic stay removed rather 
than negotiate.170 So far the creditors’ motions have been denied,171 but 
with the automatic stay set to expire February 15, 2017, “[t]ime is of the 
essence” for an agreement to be met. 172 
 
V. LESSONS FROM DETROIT AND PUERTO RICO 
 
The possibility that investors could lose billions in municipal 
bond investments because of contractual issues necessitates the 
reevaluation of how these bonds are both issued and regulated. 
According to Moody’s Investors Service, “Detroit’s attempt to  
invalidate its $1.4 billion in pension certificates” was a “radical” move 
that was unlikely to be mimicked by other issuers even if Detroit had 
 
 
166.    Id. at 619. 
167. NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, supra note 160, at 20. 
168. See supra Part IV.D. 
169. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks by Counselor Antonio Weiss 
on Puerto Rico Before the National Tax Association (Nov. 11, 2016), https:// 
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0606.aspx. 
170. It’s Vital to Make Way for Debt Negotiations, ELNUEVODIA (Nov. 4, 2016, 8:54 
AM), http://www.elnuevo dia.com/english/english/nota/ 
itsvitaltomakewayfordebtnegotiations-2258778. 
171. Id. 
172. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks by Counselor Antonio Weiss 
on Puerto Rico Before the National Tax Association (Nov. 11, 2016), https:// 
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0606.aspx. 
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been successful.173 Moody’s prediction was clearly wrong.174 Whether 
Puerto Rico’s potential voidance of its bond obligations will have any 
major impact on the municipal bond market remains to be seen, but 
some economists believe that allowing Puerto Rico to shirk on its 
promise to repay could have a chilling effect on the U.S. municipal debt 
market, thereby raising the cost of borrowing for other struggling 
cities.175  Even if the issue in Puerto Rico has little direct impact on the 
U.S. bond market, the precedent set by this case could be very harmful. 
While courts in Puerto Rico and New York have relied on the policy of 
protecting taxpayers and maintaining the integrity of the law, allowing 
insolvent municipalities to declare illegally issued bonds void would 
establish a practice severely detrimental to investors.176 If the penalty  
for borrowing above its means is keeping the borrowed money at the 
expense of its creditors, a struggling municipality will have little 
incentive to ensure that its bond offerings are in compliance with the 
law.177 While there are certainly lessons to be learned on both sides of 
the issue, because on one side—Puerto Rico—is likely to benefit from 
this situation, the focus here will be on the lessons for investors.178 The 
two major lessons that can be drawn from Detroit and Puerto Rico are: 
(1) investors are not currently protected from these voidable bond  
issues, and (2) counsel’s role in these transactions is currently 
inadequate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
173. Caitlin Devitt, Moody’s Sees Detroit COPs Repudiation as Isolated, BOND BUYER 
(Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/123_32/moodys-sees-detroit-cops- 
repudiation-as-isolated-1059885-1.html. 
174. See supra Part IV. 
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176. Since there currently exists no precedent for how illegal municipal debt of this 
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A. Current Municipal Bond Regulations Do Not Prevent Illegal 
Bond Offerings from Occurring, and Current Laws Do Not 
Protect Investors When They Do 
 
Puerto Rico was able to issue $4.1 billion in likely voidable 
bonds.179 The Commonwealth has  used  municipal  securities  in 
violation of their Constitution for decades,180 and now it is seeking to 
avoid the entirely foreseeable repercussions. The fact that such a 
manifestly unjust practice is even possible demonstrates that the current 
regulation of municipal securities is inadequate.181 This inadequacy is 
due to “sparse regulatory enforcement,”182 illustrated by the  SEC’s 
small number of enforcement proceedings and the “disparate treatment” 
of municipalities compared to corporations regarding regulatory 
noncompliance.183 
The majority of issuer regulations deal with disclosure 
obligations.184 Disclosure statements contain financial information 
“critical” for investors to assess the financial condition of a municipal 
issuer and thus analyze their investment’s safety.185 Unfortunately for 
investors, compliance with continuing disclosure requirements has been 
inconsistent and inadequate, both in timeliness186 and content.187 This is 
because, with the exception of securities fraud, the SEC’s authority over 
the disclosure practices of municipal issuers is limited under existing 
laws.188   For example, Rule 15c2-12, which sets the requirements for 
 
 
179. See supra Part IV. 
180. See PUERTO RICO COMM’N FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE AUDIT OF THE PUB. CREDIT, 
supra note 120, at 23 (“The Commonwealth cannot issue public debt, as defined by the 
Constitution, with a maturity of more than 30 years, unless it is for financing the 
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181. See infra Part V.A. 
182. Grommet, supra note 18, at 256. 
183. Grommet, supra note 18, at 260. 
184. Grommet, supra note 18, at 260–61. 
185. REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 8, at 69 (“Additional 
financial information, such as budgetary information, can be used . . . by citizens and 
citizens groups to assist them in analyzing whether tax dollars were spent in accordance  
with budgetary restrictions.”). 
186. Id. at iv. 
187. Grommet, supra note 18, at 259 (“First, more than one-third of recent municipal 
securities issuers failed to comply with the Rule 15c2-12 continuing disclosure 
requirements.”). 
188. Id. at 2. 
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municipal securities disclosures,189 does not establish the form and 
content of the financial information required to be disclosed for a 
primary offering of municipal securities.190 In addition, currently there 
are no uniform standards of accounting in the municipal securities 
market, and the SEC lacks authority to prescribe any.191 Consequently, 
the SEC has rarely enforced disclosure compliance using Rule 15c2- 
12,192 and enforcement actions for violations have mostly been limited  
to a few antifraud actions.193 
Recently there has been significant concern that many 
municipality-issuers are not complying with their continuing disclosure 
obligations and federal securities law violations involving fraudulent 
statements are widespread.194  To combat these disclosure violations,   
the SEC started the Municipalities Continuing Disclosure Cooperation 
Initiative, which allows underwriters and issuers to receive more lenient 
settlement terms from the SEC if they self-report violations, including 
false claims, of their “self-imposed continuing disclosure 
agreements.”195 The initiative has resulted in many self-reported 
violations,196 and while it fails to address the contractual issue at the 
heart of the Puerto Rican and Detroit situations, it does indicate 
heightened concern over the current municipal bond market regulatory 
framework.197 
There  are  many  issues  with  the  way  municipal  bonds  are 
 
189.    17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12 (2016). 
190. REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 8, at 70 (“The 
Commission recognized the need for flexibility in determining the content and scope of 
disclosed financial information given the diversity among types of issuers, types of issues, 
and sources of repayment.”). 
191. REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 8, at 71. 
192. As of 2012 no municipal securities regulator has ever enforced these regulations in 
court; Grommet, supra note 18, at 260. 
193. Id. 
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DISCLOSURE COOPERATION INITIATIVE (2014), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/ 
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1.html. 
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197. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks by Counselor Antonio Weiss 
on Puerto Rico Before the National Tax Association (Nov. 11, 2016), https:// 
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0606.aspx. 
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currently regulated, but even if these issues were to be remedied, the 
current regulatory scheme does nothing to directly combat the lack of a 
municipalities’ constitutional authority to issue bonds.198 Regardless of 
whether there were violations in the Puerto Rican bond offering, current 
regulations do not require an initial showing of an issuer’s authority to 
make a bond issuance.199 Accordingly, current municipal securities 
regulations do not prevent illegal bond issuances from occurring, and 
thus do not protect investors from voidable bond agreements.200 
Furthermore, when a voidable bond agreement is made, state  
law offers little to no protection to investors.201 Invalid municipal 
contract case law indicates, that where a municipality acts without 
authority, its contracts will be unenforceable and its obligations can be 
declared void.202 While some states  like  Washington203  seem  to  be 
more open to allowing unjust enrichment claims against municipalities, 
other states like Ohio seem to have a stronger policy against awarding 
such damages.204 In states with so-called “curative”  legislation 
provisions,   the   state   can   retroactively   validate   otherwise  invalid 
 
 
198. See supra Part II.B. 
199. See supra Part II.B. 
200. See supra Part II.B. 
201. See infra Part V.A. 
202. See, e.g., Granada Buildings, Inc. v. City of Kingston, 444 N.E.2d 1325, 1326  
(N.Y. 1982) (disallowing recovery against a municipality for policy reasons); S. T. Grand, 
Inc. v. City of New York, 38 A.D.2d 467, 474 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1972) (dismissing 
contractor’s action for recovery of an unpaid contract balance because the contract was 
acquired illegally via a kickback, and as such was unenforceable); González  v. 
Municipality, 61 P.R.R. 357 (1943) (refusing to grant recovery in a case of a contract 
executed without the pertinent appropriation in the municipal budget for covering the 
corresponding expense); Concrete Wall Co. v. City of Brook Park, 1976 WL190697, at *5 
(Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Feb. 26, 1976) (holding that the state of Ohio does not award unjust 
enrichment to enforce covenants given by municipalities since in City of Lancaster v. Miller 
it was decided that “[p]eople who deal with municipal bodies for their own profit should be 
required at their peril to take notice of limitations upon the powers of those bodies which 
these statutes impose”). 
203. See Edwards v. Renton, 409 P.2d 153, 155 (Wash. 1965) (holding that although the 
agreement to do work on city traffic lights was invalid, damages should be awarded to the 
developers on equitable principles based on the reasonable value of the benefits flowing to 
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204. E.g., Concrete Wall Co. v. City of Brook Park, 1976 WL190697, at *5 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 8th Dist. Feb. 26, 1976) (holding that the state of Ohio does not award unjust 
enrichment to enforce covenants given by municipalities since in City of Lancaster v. Miller 
it was decided that “[p]eople who deal with municipal bodies for their own profit should be 
required at their peril to take notice of limitations upon the powers of those bodies which 
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government action.205 Curative legislation comes in the form of judicial 
or legislative validation that can allow a state to meet its contractual 
obligations when it otherwise lacked authority,206 or can protect bonds 
from validity challenges.207  Unfortunately, curative legislation cannot  
be used to validate bonds issued illegally under a state Constitution208 or 
bonds issued in violation of a constitutional debt limitation.209 While 
other legal loopholes may exist in a state’s law that would allow 
otherwise illegal bond obligations to be enforceable, or would allow 
recovery under them, generally the law does not protect investors who 
invested in an illegal bond issuance by a state or municipality.210 
 
B. The Current Role of Municipal Bond Counsel Is Insufficient to 
Protect Investors 
 
As demonstrated in both Detroit and Puerto Rico, lawyers take 
on a crucial role in municipal securities offerings.211 Attorneys assumed 
the role of bond counsel in municipal bonds starting in the 1870s, when 
many bonds were improperly authorized and invalid.212 These invalid 
offerings caused confidence in the municipal bond market to 
plummet.213    In  order  to  restore  confidence  in  these  investments, 
 
205. See Laura K. Wendell, Mistakes Happen: Fixing Them Through Curative 
Legislation, 37 STETSON L. REV. 459, 459 (2008) (“[G]overnments have the opportunity 
under Florida law to fix certain mistakes through legislation enacted after the fact for an 
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that Chapter 6 has on bond issues). 
206. Maurice B. Kirk, Statutory Validation of Public Bonds, 7 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 281 
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208. See, e.g., State v. Belleair, 170 So. 434, 437 (Fla. 1936) (reversing a validation 
decree on four bond issues since they were issued in violation of Fla. Const. art. 9, § 7). 
209. Kirk, supra note 206, at 281; Bd. of Educ. of Calloway Cty. v. Talbott, 86 S.W.2d 
1059, 1064 (Ky. Ct. App. 1935) (“If [the legislature] is without constitutional power, it 
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210. See supra Part V. 
211. See REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 8,  at  47 
(“Lawyers, such as bond counsel, disclosure counsel, issuer’s (or borrower’s) counsel, 
trustee’s counsel, and counsel to the underwriters, also perform important roles in municipal 
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212. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON TRANSACTIONS IN SEC. OF THE CITY 
OF NEW YORK ch. 6, at 1 (1977) [hereinafter STAFF REPORT ON TRANSACTIONS], https:// 
www.sec.gov/info/municipal/staffreport0877.pdf. 
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independent counsel began to sign off on the validity of the proposed 
municipal offerings.214 These opinions “reassured” investors  that  no 
legal risks pertaining to validity or enforceability of their investments 
were present.215 Today, counsel’s role concerns (1) the validity and 
enforceability of the authorization and issuance of municipal securities, 
and (2) the tax-exempt nature of the security.216 To accomplish these 
tasks, counsel reviews the applicable law to confirm the issuer’s 
authority to issue the bonds as well as the issuer’s conformity with any 
other legal requirements pertaining to its bonds’ validity217—including a 
municipality’s maximum bond indebtedness.218 
Bond counsel are supposed to render an opinion regarding the 
validity and enforceability of bonds only if they are “firmly convinced” 
as to their validity.219 Objectively, counsel should not  have  been  
“firmly convinced,” given the financial issues both in Detroit and Puerto 
Rico, and particularly with the funding mechanism employed in 
Detroit.220 While admittedly there is a degree of hindsight in this 
critique, Puerto Rico acknowledged in both of its offerings that it might 
not have the authority to borrow due to constitutional constraints.221 In 
addition, both the 2014 General Obligation Bond issuance and the 2015 
Tax Refund Anticipation Notes issuance contained the applicable 
constitutional provisions, and discussed them in some detail.222 Despite 
this, in both offerings counsel attested that the bonds were valid and 
enforceable.223 
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Admittedly, bond opinions are by practice, limited,224 and 
municipal bond counsel, contrary to corporate bond counsel, do not 
represent that they have gone beyond a formal review of the documents 
when they submit the opinion to the client municipality.225 In fact, as is 
typical in the practice, 226 counsel in the Puerto Rican offering 
specifically stated that it was relying on facts from the Puerto Rican 
Secretary and made no further inquiry into the facts  themselves.227 
Thus, it is highly likely that these firms did not have access to all of 
Puerto Rico’s accounting and budgetary information, and even if they 
did, they still may not have been able to determine whether Puerto Rico 
was within its 15% limitation in order to determine whether the bonds 
were in compliance with Puerto Rico’s Constitutional debt limit.228 
However, it is quite clear from the bond offering disclosure that at least 
some of the funds were to be used to finance operational costs and prior 
deficits.229 Puerto Rico’s Constitution  requires  that  Puerto  Rico 
maintain a balanced budget, which prohibits the government from 
borrowing to cover budget deficits.230 As a result, Puerto Rico’s actions 
were clearly inconsistent with the law, and their illegal expenditures 
were not hidden in the offering.231 
The purpose of bond counsel is to ensure that the bonds are  
valid and that the municipality has the authority to make the offering,232 
but as seen here, counsel’s current role is insufficient.233 Although 
investors realize there are inherently some limitations in counsel 
opinions,234 these “limitations” typically deal with the marketability of 
the bonds, or substantial changes that occur only after the opinion is 
rendered, rather than the validity of the underlying  transaction.235  Both 
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investors and insurers rely on these opinions,236 and consequently, law 
firms that serve as bond counsel need to be held to a higher standard.237 
If firms are to sign off on a $4.1 billion bond offering, there should not 
be a scintilla of doubt that the bonds are in fact  valid.238  Without 
knowing whether or not Puerto Rico was within its debt limitation, 
counsel should not have signed off on the enforceability of these 
deals.239 In addition, more attention needs to be paid to the laws 
governing bond offerings. 240 Puerto Rico was not hiding the fact that it 
was spending its bond proceeds in violation of its Constitution, and 
either its counsel or the bank’s counsel should have spotted this and 
stopped the offering.241 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Currently, the consequence of issuing invalid municipal debt is 
that investors lose billions.242 While there are several lessons to  be 
learned from the Detroit and Puerto Rico debacles, the most important 
lesson is that investors must understand they are not currently protected 
from their bonds being declared void—notwithstanding a clean opinion 
by the counsel involved in the bond’s issuance.243 With this increased 
awareness, investors can start to take measures to increase the safety of 
their investments. While all investments possess some uncertainty, any 
additional assurance an investor can acquire that the bonds are legal and 
enforceable is clearly desirable. After Detroit and Puerto Rico, choice- 
of-law provisions should garner more attention in these deals.244 These 
provisions allow parties to contract with greater certainty, as the 
provisions allow parties to predict their rights and liabilities under the 
contract.245     While  in  Puerto  Rico  the  applicable  law  may  not   be 
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outcome determinative, a survey of state law around the country 
suggests that the presence of small differences in laws could be 
important for creditors seeking quasi-contractual recovery.246 
While investors must take actions to protect themselves, 
improvements to municipal securities regulation should also be 
implemented.247 Currently, unless there was some fraudulent activity in 
connection with a bond offering, an issuer is unlikely to face liability 
under federal securities laws.248 Although a change to the regulatory 
scheme to address an issue as rare as voidable municipal bonds is 
unlikely, further regulation of municipal issuers will nevertheless 
provide increased protection to investors by ensuring their access to 
financial information and timely continuing disclosures.249 In order to 
accomplish this, Congress should give the SEC funding and authority to 
directly require disclosures from municipal issuers, establish the form 
and content of these disclosures, and enforce their continuing disclosure 
obligations and deadlines.250 In addition, Congress should consider 
authorizing the SEC to require municipal securities issuers to have their 
financial statements audited, and allow the Internal Revenue Service  
and SEC to share more information about an issuer’s fiscal situation.251 
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This would not only provide bondholders with more accurate 
information, it also would allow bond counsel to have better  
information as to the financial state of the issuer and make a more 
informed opinion regarding the authority of the issuer in these 
transactions. 252 
Finally, the role of legal counsel in these transactions must be 
reevaluated and improved.253 As previously discussed, “curative” 
legislation is not available to remedy counsel issues.254 The 
consequences for counsel mistakes are billion dollar losses to investors, 
for whom there is seemingly little or no recourse.255 When a material 
fact, if false, has the ability to invalidate the entire transaction and 
render bond counsel’s opinion incorrect, counsel must conduct further 
investigation rather than rely solely on certifications presented to them 
by the issuer.256 Counsel must also ensure that their opinions fully 
consider the relevant laws and facts that will dictate the offering’s 
validity, as they could face potential lawsuits from the investors and 
other institutions who heavily rely on their opinions in evaluating 
whether to invest in these securities.257 
A combination of increased investor awareness, regulatory 
improvements, and more thorough municipal bond counsel practices 
will prevent another Detroit or Puerto Rican debt debacle in the 
future.258 On the other hand, there could be some positives that come 
from these cases. A lack of equitable remedies to protect investors 
should result in more prudent and careful investing, and may prompt 
regulatory changes resulting in better investor protection.  At the same 
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time, municipalities attempting to void debts will likely result in 
mistrust in municipalities and could hurt future municipal efforts in 
raising funds.259 The greatest potential negative impact is that, if Puerto 
Rico is able keep the billions it received from its invalid bonds, it could 
encourage future municipalities in dire financial situations to do the 
same. Looking toward the looming debt crisis in Chicago and other 
struggling municipalities, the precedent set from this case could be 
influential in shaping the municipal securities market going forward. 
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